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The Personalist Foundations 
of the Ethics of Reproduction! 
John F. Crosby 
The author, who is presently at the International Academy of 
Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein, gave thefollowing address 
at the Bay Area Conference on the Ethics of Human Reproduction. It is 
reprinted here with permissionfrom Dr. Damian Fedoryka, president of 
Christendom College, Front Royal, Virginia. 
On the occasion of being made a cardinal in 1879, John Henry Newman 
gave a famous speech in Rome, in which he said of his life's work, "For 
thirty, forty, fifty years I have resisted to the best of my powers the spirit of 
Liberalism in religion." He proceeded to explain just what this life-long 
adversary of his was. He said : 
Liberalism in religion is the doctrine that there is no positive truth in religion, but 
that one creed is as good as another . . .. It is inconsistent with any recognition of 
any religion, as true. It teaches that all are to be tolerated, for all are matters of 
opinion. Revealed religion is not a truth, but a sentiment and a taste; not an 
objective fact, not miraculous; and it is the right of each individual to make it say 
just what strikes his fancy. 
In this liberalism we all recognize the subjectivism and relativism which are 
second nature to so many people today, and which are such an impediment 
to the reception of the Vatican instruction on reproductive technology, 
and indeed an impediment to all of Catholic moral teaching insofar as this 
teaching talks of objectively valid moral norms, which human beings did 
not devise. 
There is, however, something in Newman's address which may surprise 
you. At the end of it, reflecting on the future of liberalism and Christianity, 
he says: 
Christianity has been too often in what seemed deadly peril that we should fear 
for it any new trial now. So far is certain; on the other hand, what is uncertain, 
and in these great contests commonly is uncertain, and what is commonly a great 
surprise, when it is witnessed, is the particular mode by which , in the event , 
Providence rescues and saves His elect inheritance. Sometimes our enemy is 
turned into a friend; sometimes he is despoiled of that special virulence of evil 
which was so threatening ... . 
August , 1988 43 
It is surprising, is it not, that Newman considers whether the enemy which 
is liberalism might not yet be "turned into a friend" and "despoiled of its 
virulence of evil". Of course Newman does not mean that Christianity 
could ever make its peace with the idea that "one creed is as good as 
another". What he means, I think, is that this liberalism may be a 
manifestation of a deeper movement of thought, and that this deeper 
movement of thought may bear within itself energies and ideas which can 
be appropriated by Christianity, and which can even enrich Christianity, 
and enrich it at the very time that Christianity repels as abhorrent to itself 
the relativism of liberalism. 
What might this deeper movement of thought be? We can get a glimpse 
of it in Newman himself. While Newman was absolutely committed to the 
objective truth of revelation, as we have just heard, he was at the same time 
extraordinarily sensitive to the subjectivity of belief. He was not only 
concerned with believing what is in itself true, but also with believing it in 
such a way that our existence is transformed through our believing. He did 
not think it was enough to lead people to give just any assent to the truth; 
he distinguished between real and notional assent, and held that a merely 
notional assent, even if its object were ever so true, cannot support a 
committed religious existence. He held that believers have to give a real 
assent to revelation, a concrete, imaginative assent in which they assent not 
just with their mind, but with their whole being. This is why Newman was 
so sharply critical of a certain kind of apologetics which tried to give 
formal demonstrations of the truths about God and revelation. Newman 
said of such demonstrations that they "do not warm me and enlighten me; 
they do not take away the winter of my desolation, or make the buds 
unfold and the leaves grow within me, and my moral being rejoice." 
Newman was looking for an experiential knowledge of God; only concrete 
experiential religious knowledge could take away the winter of his 
desolation. But the traditional demonstrations gave him only abstract 
knowledge about God , and so seemed to him barren. Newman tried, 
instead, to find God in conscience, for there, he thought, God can be 
encountered, not just inferred but encountered, and in this encounter we 
can give a real assent to His being. You see, then, why I say that Newman 
was especially sensitive to the subjectivity of religious belief; he was not 
only concerned with the objective truth about God, but also with the lived 
experience of God . 
An Additional Observation 
One more observation on Newman. One of the richest and most original 
parts of Newman's work is his probing of the subjectivity of the believer, 
and attempting to make it deeper and more truthful. Newman's thought 
would not have its seminal power and its unique fascinating character, nor 
would it be able to touch us so deeply, if Newman had not taken his turn 
toward the subjectivity of belief. This means that Newman did not just 
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react against liberalism, but appropriated for his faith the awakening to 
personal subjectivity which underlies it, even as he rejected its 
subjectivism, and in this way he tried to deprive an enemy of its special 
virulence of evil, and even to turn him into a friend. 
I have begun with Newman because it seems to me that what he did for 
our understanding of religious belief, we have to do for our understanding 
of man. In the modern period there really has occurred something which 
can be called "the discovery of the person and of personal subjectivity". 
This is a dangerous movement of thought, and it has spawned the crippling 
subjectivism which we see all around us , and which makes Catholic moral 
teaching seem unintelligible to many of our contemporaries. But it is not to 
be simply rejected; for we can deepen our understanding of man by 
considering him as person, and by probing his subjectivity and freedom. 
This is not just my opinion; as everyone knows, it is also the view of John 
Paul II, for whom the future of the Christian understanding of man lies in 
the direction of a new Christian personalism. And this personalism is not 
just favored by a pope; it is incorporated in many ways in the documents of 
Vatican II. What , for example, is the Council's Declaration on Religious 
Liberty if not a monument to this personalism? 
And so I will venture to speak of the autonomy of the person, and the 
su bjectivity of the person, knowing full well that these terms are often used 
in a destructive and anti-Christian sense, but at the same time convinced 
that, probed deeply enough, they will yield up a Christian sense. Let us 
hope that in our deliberations together we will find fulfilled the scriptural 
promise that Christians will be able to handle poisonous serpents without 
being harmed by them. 
I have been asked to speak to you about man as a spiritual being. I 
propose to attempt this by unfolding the structure of man as person; for it 
seems to me that the spiritual nature of man is nothing other than his 
personal nature. Of course an inquiry into man as spiritual being will 
usually include some reflections on the immateriality of spirit, and I will 
not have enough time to raise the question of what is immaterial in man. 
But I think that by approaching the spirituality of man through his 
personality, we can lay the foundation for important new arguments for 
the immateriality ofthe most inward part of man, and below I shall indicate 
some of them. And besides, there is a very considerable personalist 
contribution to be made to our understanding of man as spirit, even apart 
from the question of the immateriality of spirit. 
There are 0 bviously great pastoral advantages in speaking the language 
of a personalist understanding of man; the more we speak of man as 
person, and express moral truths in a personalist way, the more we are 
likely to be heard. But it is not primarily these pastoral advantages which I 
want to explore, but the purely theoretical enrichment which we can 
expect from a Christian personalism. 
There are three highly significant and revealing aspects of man as person 
which will form the main points of reference of my talk. 
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Major Points of Reference 
I. I begin where Karol Wojtylia often begins in his reflections on the 
human person, namely with the inwardness of the person. In "Gaudium et 
spes", the Council fathers speak of the same thing under the name of the 
interiority of the person. This inwardness is manifested, I believe, in the 
power of the person to act through himself, out of himself, or in other 
words, to perform acts which are radically his own. We know what it is to 
act in such a way that we merely transmit what originates in others rather 
than act on our own and out of ourselves. This happens when, for example, 
we repeat the opinions or imitate the practices of someone without really 
understanding those opinions or practices, and thus without having those 
opinions and practices as our own, as the imitated person has them as his 
own. This is, in fact, the form of all merely conventional opining and 
acting. We come alive as persons only when we make our opinions and 
practices our own; only then do we act out of ourselves, and give evidence 
of our inwardness as persons. 
This throws some light on what Vatican II taught about the respect 
which must be shown for the religious liberty of all persons. The idea 
behind this respect seems to be that coercion hinders persons in forming 
religious convictions which are entirely their own, and thus hinders them 
in living as persons. Even if that which persons are coerced to hold is 
objectively true, and even if this coercion unifies the whole society in the 
truth, persons are violated by the coercion. One ought to respect persons 
even if one thereby pays the price of many people falling into error and of 
society losing its unity in the truth. 
Some may want to object already at this point, saying that this train of 
thought is nothing but a concession to subjectivism. One may say that I am 
speaking as if the main thing for each person is that his opinions and 
practices be his own, and that it doesn't much matter if they are true 
opinions and justified practices. But to focus on the inwardness of the 
person involves no such subjectivism;just the contrary. It is not difficult to 
show that the person achieves this inwardness precisely in encountering 
what is objectively valid, and it is especially easy to show this by referring 
to the moral life. 
As long as I am just motivated by what is subjectively agreeable, I tend 
to lose my power of acting through myself. When Oscar Wilde looked 
back on his life of unrestrained pleasure-seeking and gratification, he said, 
"I ceased to be captain of my soul." But when we let ourselves be motivated 
primarily by what is objectively good and right, when we recognize the 
demands which the good makes of us, it is different. No one who is in the 
habit of serving what is good and right ever complained with the words of 
Oscar Wilde, "I ceased to be captain of my soul." Though that which is 
objectively good and worthy may demand from us a commitment which 
imposes pain and sacrifice, it never tends to cramp and hinder our 
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acting through ourselves; it never dethrones us as persons when we submit 
to it, or carries us away with a seductive sirensong. On the contrary; the 
demands of right and wrong take us seriously as persons; they stir up in us 
the depth of conscience, which is the supreme inwardness ofthe person. It 
is never so much we ourselves who act, as when our acting is a matter of 
conscience. In conscience we come fully alive as persons, and experience in 
ourselves our inwardness, and manifest this inwardness to others. 
All of this is well expressed by the Thomas More of the play, A Manior 
All Seasons. More says to Norfolk: 
I will not give in because I oppose it - I do - not my pride, not my spleen, nor 
any other of my appetites but 1 do - I (MO RE goes up to him andfeels him up 
and down like an animal . . . .) Is there no single sinew in the midst of this that 
serves no appetite of Norfolk's but is just Norfolk? (pp. 71-72) 
Notice that it is in a matter of conscience, in which he discerns the demands 
of the moral law, that Thomas More can most emphatically and 
expressively say, "I", and be called by his name. Insofar as he is subject to 
appetites and subjective wants, this "I" gets lost, for these appetites do not 
reach down into the "I", and have no power to call it into life. Now this "I" 
is nothing other than the inwardness of the person. 
Obstacles to Inwardness 
We have, then, found three obstacles to the inwardness of the person. 
This inwardness is weakened, first , by merely conventional acting; 
secondly by coercion; and finally, by being dominated by appetite and the 
merely agreeable. What do not - precisely do not - weaken or eliminate 
this inwardness, are the demands of right and wrong, for these demands 
have a power of eliciting this inwardness like nothing else has. Indeed, we 
discover the ultimate depth of our inwardness only in relation to these 
demands, for it is in conscience that we achieve this depth of inwardness, 
and conscience is nothing else but that spiritual organ which is sensitive to 
the demands of right and wrong. 
You see, then, that the inwardness of the person, rightly understood , has 
no tendency to imply subjectivism, or to loosen in any way the relation 
between the person and the objective moral law. You see, in fact, that the 
very opposite is the case. 
2. If we recall the Scholastic axiom, agere sequitur esse, "as a thing is , so 
it acts," we are led to the second aspect of the person which I want to 
discuss with you. If the acting proper to the person is acting through 
oneself, how must the being of the person be? What is that ultimate 
structure of being in the person which lets the person act through himself? 
It seems to me that the answer which Karol Wojtyla has given to this 
question constitutes one of the most important parts of his personalistic 
anthropology. He answers with a principle first formulated by the Roman 
jurists: persona est sui iuris. "A person is a being of his own", or "A person 
is a being which exists in his own right." Rendering more freely into a 
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familiar idiom, we can say, "A person is an end in himself, he exists in a 
sense for his own sake." Wojtyla's preferred way of rendering it freely is 
this: the person is one who belongs to himself, or who possesses himself. 
Only because the person is gathered into himself as one who belongs to 
himself and possesses himself, can he act through himself. If the person 
were so strongly integrated into his surroundings as to be a mere part of 
them, and were thus eliminated as a being o/his own, he could not possibly 
act with the inwardness of which I was speaking, that is, he could not act 
through himself. 
Let us try to find a revealing experience of our self-possession. We all 
know what it is to be in a conscious condition which is the very opposite of 
self-possession, namely in a condition of distraction and dispersion. In this 
condition we are lost in the things around us. Our inwardness is weakened, 
so that we lack a firm ground in ourselves on which to stand in dealing with 
the impressions which we receive and the experiences which we undergo. 
This weakening of our inwardness can, under certain circumstances, go 
very far, as when a person watches television in a very passive way. The 
glazed look on his face reveals the far-reaching loss of himself in that at 
which he is looking. Such a state of consciousness approaches a mere 
succession of impressions, in which memory in all its deeper forms tends to 
be extinguished, and the person tends to live completely in the present 
impression, and to be unable to take any spiritual distance to it. Such a 
person does not amount to a subject consciously facing some object. He 
cannot really originate any life and activity which is his own, but he rather 
tends to be borne along by what happens to him and what happens in him. 
It is clear that in this dispersed state of consciousness the person loses 
possession of himself, and tends, thereby, to be weakened as person. 
Coming to Center of One's Being 
But in this condition of inner dispersion, a person has the power of what 
is expressively called recollecting himself. This means that he can come to 
himself. He can recover the center of his being. He can take a distance to 
what he experiences, and awaken to it. He can become a subject facing an 
objective world, and not just the shadow cast in consciousness by the 
objective world. In all this he comes alive as person, and revives as a being 
of his own. But what is this coming alive as person but a taking possession 
of himself? Before recollecting himself he was possessed by the objects of 
experience; now he deals with them out of his self-possession. We find in 
the experience of recollection exactly what we are looking for; in 
recollecting ourselves we experience self-possession, and we experience the 
fullness of personal life, and we experience the connection between the 
two. We experience this fullness as consisting in self-possession. 
This is perhaps the place to report the observation of Josef Pieper (The 
Philosophical Act) that, according to the tradition of Western philosophy, 
the essence of spirit lies precisely in this self-possession. You see, then, why 
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I think that a philosophy and metaphysics of the person is capable of 
deepening our understanding of man as a spiritual being. 
And yet despite this link with the tradition, I am sure that, with my 
reflection on recollection, I revive in some people the suspicion that I will, 
after all, not succeed in avoiding su bjectivism. For it will be 0 bjected to me 
that a person is a person whether recollected or not, whether in full 
possession of himself or not. One will say that, by making so much of 
recollection in my account of the person, I make it difficult to understand 
how the embryo could be a person, since the embryo does not yet have a 
conscious life which could be more or less recollected. One will say that I 
have given up a metaphysical analysis of the person in favor of a merely 
psychological one. 
I answer that of course the being of the person does not exhaust itself in 
conscious self-presence, and that of course a person belongs to himself no 
matter what his conscious condition, and, in fact , can exist even in the 
absence of any conscious life. My idea is simply that a person actualizes his 
personal being most fully in recollection, and that therefore personal being 
shows itself most clearly for what it is in and through recollected self-
presence. Wojtyla has said much about the way in which the metaphysical 
structure of personal being shows itself in Erleben, in conscious self-
presence. He warns against a dualism of metaphysical being, on the one 
hand, and consciousness, on the other, as if our metaphysical being were 
completely hidden from our conscious self-presence, or as if conscious 
self-presence were in no way formed by the metaphysical truth of our 
being. He is surely right to say that the basic structure of the person, who is 
sui iuris and belongs to himself, manifests itself in - does not exhaust itself 
in, but manifests itself in - consciousness. 
To See More Clearly 
Those who want to see more clearly the continuity of our approach to 
the human person with the tradition of Western metaphysics, should 
consider that in talking of the person as belonging to himself, and acting 
through himself, we are in effect speaking of the substantiality of the 
person. For a substance is nothing but a being which exists not as the part 
or property of another, but on its own, standing in itself. My thesis, 
expressed in terms of substance, is simply that a being which is capable of 
recollection must have a particular perfection of su bstantiality, and such a 
being gives evidence of this perfection in a uniquely revealing way in the 
experience of recollecting itself. 
You see, then, that there is no need to playoff the experience of the 
person against the being of the person, and you see why Wojtyla and others 
think that the approach to the being of the person through the experience 
of the person ought to be cultivated more seriously than it has been 
cultivated in the Christian philosophical tradition. 
But there is another objection which I have to face from the critics of 
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modern subjectivism. One will say that this self-possession of the person is 
just another name for the autonomy of the person, and that if you take 
autonomy to be one of the most significant facts about the person, you 
undermine all subsequent ethical analysis . For then you play right into the 
hands of those who say that since persons belong to themselves and are 
their own, they have to be understood primarily as holders of rights, such 
as a right over their bodies, or a right over their lives. Such rights are then 
taken as justifying say, a woman renting out her uterus as an incu bator, or 
as justifying a suffering patient requesting a lethal injection. 
My response is this. Just as the idea of an agent intellect was often 
understood in a pantheistic way in the middle ages, and was nevertheless 
retained by St. Thomas, who gave it a theistic interpretation, so the idea of 
the autonomy of the person has to be retained. Our task is to despoil it of 
the virulence of evil which it all too often has, and to make it fruitful for a-
true vision of the human person. Just a couple of thoughts on how this 
might be done. 
a) We have to remember that though the person belongs to himself, he 
nevertheless does not exist through himself. He is not a divine being. He 
rather exists through God. But in existing through God , he comes to 
belong to God. Depending on God for existence, which is defacto relation, 
gives rise to belonging to God, a de iure relation. And so the human 
person, though as person he is his own, as creature is not his own, but is 
God's. There is in the human person a paradoxical unity of selfhood and 
dependency, of being anchored in himself and being anchored in God . The 
idea of the autonomy of the person can be made to serve and enrich the 
Christian understanding of man as long as it is not divinized, but keeps its 
place within this paradoxical unity. 
I know of no better way to probe this unity of autonomy and theonomy, 
as it could be called, than by returning to the experience of recollection. It 
is no accident that almost all the accounts of recollection which we have 
are found in religious writers (recall, for instance, what authors such as 
Guardini and von Hildebrand have written on recollection). For as 
everyone with only a little experience of the religious life knows, nothing 
has such power to recollect as turning to God, and immersing ourselves in 
the ultimacy and absoluteness of God; in this encounter with God we 
return to ourselves , we recover ourselves, and retake possession of 
ourselves. In recollection we can "read" the creaturely character of our 
self-possession. 
St. Thomas Expresses Unity 
This unity of autonomy and theonomy in the human person is expressed 
profoundly, though less experientially, by St. Thomas Aquinas in the 
important Chapter III of the Summa Contra Gentiles, III, where he 
explains why divine providence governs rational creatures for their own 
sake. In speaking of God exercising providence over man, and governing 
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him, he expresses the theonomy of the human person. In speaking of God 
governing man for his own (that is, man's own) sake, he expresses the 
autonomy of man as person. 
You see, then, how we can despoil the Egyptians as we go out of Egypt, 
appropriating for our own purposes the autonomy of the human person. 
And once we accomplish this work of appropriation, we can speak of the 
autonomy of the person without making any least concessions in our 
ethical analyses. Thus for instance a suffering patient has no right to 
request a lethal injection, because as creature he is not in every respect his 
own; he would act impiously towards the one to whom he belongs by 
making the ultimate disposition over his life of directly ending his life. 
b) One other thought on the fruitfulness of the concept of personal 
autonomy. In his profound study, Love and Responsibility, Karol Wojtyla 
has tried to revision the love between man and woman in terms of the 
self-possession of the human person. His thought is that it is only because 
each person belongs to himself and is his own, that he can give himself 
away in a spousal way. If men and women were not sui iuris, there could be 
no spousal self-donation between them, nor could they perform the 
consent of marriage. There is no reason, but no reason at all, why the 
self-possession of the person should be explained merely in terms of rights 
which the person has; it should also be explained in terms of the power of 
self-donation which he has and which surely reveals his self-possession 
more fully than does his ability to be a right-holder. 
Notice that we have found two ways in which the self-possession of the 
person underlies the acting of the person. It underlies all acting through 
himself, as we saw, and it underlies, as it were a second time, all such acting 
when it is the acting of spousal self-donation. 
N ow consider how fruitful it is for ethical analysis to think of the love of 
man and woman in terms of self-donation. John Paul thinks that we can, 
on this basis, show in a particularly convincing way the unity of the sexual 
union of spouses , and openness to procreation. His claim is that the sexual 
union of spouses, when it is sterilized' and deprived of its procreative 
possibility, is gravely comprised as an expression of spousal self-donation, 
and is even turned into something opposed to self-donation; that the 
possibility of procreation must remain open if the spouses are to give 
themselves to each other without reserve and without deformation of their 
love. I do not mean to reproduce his whole analysis right now, but if he is 
right, then he has advanced an extremely attractive "personalist" 
argument in behalf of this difficult teaching of the Church. It is an 
argument based on spousal love as a self-donation of persons, and self-
donation is, in turn, based on the self-possession of persons. You see then 
how erroneous is the view that persons, once recognized as having the 
autonomy of self-possession, can only become solitary, promethean 
beings. 
And it is not just the question of artificial contraception which is 
illuminated by understanding the spousal union as a union of self-
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donation. The issue of artificial fertilization is also illuminated. For if the 
spousal union had nothing to do with self-donation but were only say the 
exercise of "legalized lust", why would it be irreplaceable as the direct 
origin of a new human person? If it provided the spouses nothing but the 
relief of their concupiscence, what would be lost in the way of deep human 
meaning if one bypassed it as the direct source of a new human being and 
instead brought one into existence in vitro? Only because in the spousal 
union the spouses "make a sincere gift of themselves one to another," as the 
Council put it, and do not exploit each other for their own gratification, 
does it become a serious question whether this spousal union can ever be 
replaced by artificial means of fertilization . As I say, this self-donation is 
possible only in beings who have the autonomy of being sui iuris and of 
possessing themselves in the sense explained. 
Reflections Began on Person 
We began our reflections on the person with the acting proper to the 
person, which, as we saw, is acting through oneself, and have proceeded to 
the being proper to one who can act in this way, which as we saw is the 
being of belonging to oneself and existing as an end in oneself. 
3. I proceed now to the third aspect of personal being which I want to 
discuss with you, and that is the unrepeatability of the person. This , too , is 
an aspect of the person which, as far as I can see, has come into prominence 
only in recent centuries. It is, to my mind, a particularly significant aspect 
of the person, and deeply reveals to us man precisely as person. 
Let us suppose a person who loves another. And let us suppose that it is 
proposed to this person that the beloved person be removed from his life 
for good, but at the same time be replaced by another person just like the 
beloved person. The one who loves will, of course, not accept the idea that 
he can continue to love the other in the same way after this exchange of 
persons. No less would he reject the proposal not just to replace the 
beloved with an equivalent person, but to improve on the beloved with a 
better person, as if he could love this new person with the same love with 
which he loved the previous person, only with the love having been made 
more ardent by the superiority of the new person. He will protest that he 
does not love an exemplar of certain repeatable traits , but this particular 
person, who is unrepeatable. Precisely the attitude of love for another 
makes us alive to this unrepeatability in persons. 
This unrepeatability is too often identified with the unrepeatability of 
the genetic makeup of a human being, or of those traits of race, 
temperament, intelligence, etc., which depend on the genetic makeup of an 
individual. These traits are indeed woven together in a given individual in a 
way which is hardly ever repeated by other individuals, but this is only a 
relative unrepeatability; there is, after all, no absurdity in exactly these 
traits being repeated in exactly these interconnections in a second and a 
third individual, and indeed, this repeating is just what happens in the case 
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of identical twins. The unrepeatability of which we speak lies at a deeper 
level in a human being. It lies in the depths of his personal being; perhaps 
we could say that it is not a relative but an absolute unrepeatability. 
Let us try to understand the absolute unrepeatability of the person in 
terms of the self-possession which we were just discussing. We begin by 
considering things which really are in a sense repeatable. Consider for 
example one of the millions of copies of today's newspaper; whatever it 
contains is almost entirely repeated by all the many other copies; it is 
nothing butthe bearer of a content which is just as well borne by each of 
the millions of copies. If I should lose my copy, my loss can be entirely 
replaced by buying a new copy, so that the interest which I took in reading 
the first is exactly like, and perhaps even identically the same as, my 
interest in reading the second; for my interest has as its object simply 
"today's newspaper," and not this copy of it as distinct from that · one, 
though of course my interest requires some individual copy or other. If 
each human person were related to "man" or to "the human person" as an 
individual newspaper is related to "today's newspaper"; if each human 
person were merely a copy of "the human person"; if each were a mere 
exemplar or specimen of it, then he would be abolished as person, and it 
would after all not be the human person who is instantiated by the 
individual. And why? Because as exemplar a human person would cease to 
be what we found him to be above in #2: he would cease to stand in himself 
and belong to himself and have a being of his own; his whole being would 
instead lie in the general type, "the human person," which would belong as 
much to all other human individuals which instantiate it as it belongs to 
himself. As exemplar, a human person would not be anchored in himself in 
the sense of being sui iuris, but would exist for the sake of that which he 
exemplifies. The truth is that a human person is no more a mere exemplar 
of a type than he is a mere instrumental means for realizing some result: his 
belonging to himself excludes the former no less than the latter. It follows 
that the human person must have his human nature, and much else which 
he has besides, as unrepeatably his own; he must be unrepeatably himself if 
he is to have that "being of his own" which we found above to belong to 
persons. 
A Remarkable Fact 
With this we encounter one ofthe most remarkable facts about persons: 
we experience such an amazing concreteness in persons; most non-persons 
are by contrast experienced as abstract. This concreteness, this density and 
heaviness of existence, is nothing but an aspect of the unrepeatability of 
the person; it comes from the fact that the person is so strongly a being of 
his own, that he is never a mere exemplar of his kind, or of the attributes 
which he has. The abstractness of most non-persons comes from the fact 
that what we experience in them is not inseparably one with their concrete 
being but is a kind of general type which can as well be instantiated in other 
beings of the same kind. 
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We catch sight here for the first time of an all-important aspect of 
personal being, namely of the worth or dignity of the person. Precisely in 
grasping this concreteness of the person, we feel - we do not infer it but we 
spontaneously feel it, whether we want to or not - the worth of the person, 
and we feel a respect for the other, and even the beginnings of something 
like love for the other. It is no accident that I made my first approach to the 
unrepeatability of the person through the experience of loving a person. 
We can, of course, find worth and ontological dignity in the basic powers 
of the person, such as the power to understand and to choose freely; but it 
is above all when we experience these powers as possessed by a particular 
person that we strongly experience what we call the worth or dignity of the 
person. 
This means that we should take care not to speak of the dignity of the 
person as if it were conferred from without by God, or as if it were 
intelligible only by directly setting the person in relation to God. Though 
this dignity is ultimately grounded in God, it is at the same time entirely 
intrinsic to the person, and grows out of the person at exactly that point at 
which the person is a being of his own. We do not have to get people to 
share our faith as a condition for understanding the dignity of the person. 
It is enough, at least for a start, if we can get them to listen more closely to 
their experience of persons. 
One last thought on unrepeatability. It enables us to understand why it is 
that, though there are so many human persons, each one exists as if it were 
the only one, and never as merely "one among many". If each human being 
merely exemplified the human species and the various excellences of which 
human beings are capable, it would follow that the more human beings 
there are, the more each would get reduced to insignificance in comparison 
to all the many others. But the person, through his unrepeatability, has in 
himself that which can never be reduced to insignificance by ever so many 
others. 
As we have seen, this unrepeatability is understood precisely in terms of 
the belonging of the person to himself, which means that it belongs to the 
autonomy of the person. I suppose that those who are suspicious of all talk 
of the autonomy of the person will be surprised to find that the study of this 
autonomy does not just lead to a theory of the person as subject of rights, 
but leads into the depths of the being and the preciousness of the person. 
Arguments for Immateriality 
Here we might make a brief mention of some of the arguments for the 
immateriality of the core of the person to which I referred above when I 
was reflecting on what it means to say that man is a spiritual being. Could it 
not be shown that no material being can act through itself in the sense in 
which the person acts through itself? That no material being can take 
possession of itself as persons can and must? That nothing material can 
have the unrepeatability which we have found in persons? Of course, the 
bodies of persons participate in various ways in the unrepeatability of the 
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person, but do they not have unrepeatability in a derived and secondary 
way? Is it not non-bodily and non-material being which is required as the 
primary "seat" of this unrepeatability? As I already said, these questions 
will have to remain only questions in this paper, but I did not want to omit 
at least a mention of them, and an indication of the direction in which, in 
my opinion, the answers to them lie. 
Surely the unrepeatability of the person, even if developed only to the 
point to which we have developed it, can be made fruitful for the issues of 
bioethics which we want to study at this conference. On the basis of this 
unrepeatability, we understand better the unconditional respect which 
must be shown to all the persons involved in the use of the newest 
reproductive technology. We understand that it is not a morally indifferent 
matter how persons come into existence, but that the procreation of them 
must be appropriate to the unrepeatable personhood of each. If a new 
human being were just another specimen of the human species, and were 
related to the species in basically the same way any animal is related to its 
species, then what is so ethically disturbing about artificial methods of 
bringing a new human being into existence? Why would these methods be 
fundamentally more problematic with human beings than with animals? 
Indeed, what would be wrong with simply destroying defective specimens 
ofthe human species, if we were really dealing with specimens? There is an 
ethical issue here, because human beings are not specimens but persons, 
and as persons are unrepeatable. Of course I do not think that all the 
difficult ethical questions which might be asked about this reproductive 
technology can be easily answered by invoking the unrepeatability of 
persons, but this unrepeatability has to form the constant background of 
all our deliberations on these questions, otherwise we have no chance of 
reaching the truth about them. 
To conclude. All Christians have to reject subjectivism. We all have to 
reject the doctrine, first formulated by the Greek sophist, Progatoras, that 
"man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that they are, and 
of the things that are not, that they are not." But in rejecting subjectivism, 
we must not reject the modern attention to and concern with the 
subjectivity of the person. For this turn to personal subjectivity can be 
deprived of its potential virulence of evil, and be transformed into a friend 
of philosophical realism, and be made to serve the development of a 
Christian humanism, and of Christian ethics. 
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